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The Doha Negotiations on Trade in Goods:  An European Perspective 
 
Patrick A. Messerlin 1/ 
 
The note reviews the basic market access issues in the Doha negotiations on trade in goods 
from an European perspective.  First, it shows that some European negotiators are demanding 
more concessions in manufacturing (NAMA) that the European business community is asking 
for – adding strong tensions in a context already marked by severe problems in farm talks.  
Second, the note reveals the European interests really at stake in the agricultural negotiations, 
before addressing the negotiating issues per se. 
 
Section 1.  The NAMA Negotiations  
 
One of the “gems” of the Hong Kong Ministerial is the decision to use the so-called “Swiss” 
formula in NAMA. 2/  The Swiss formula is an efficient instrument from a negotiating point of 
view (it is the simplest possible negotiating tool) from an economic perspective (it cuts high 
tariffs by more than small tariffs, hence magnifying welfare gains and possibly improving 
tariff revenues) and from a domestic political point of view (it minimizes the fights among 
domestic interests about the level of the post- liberalization tariffs). 
 
The emerging economies with large and rapidly growing markets for industrial products still 
impose substantial bound and applied tariffs (Table 1).  Freer trade would thus provide large 
gains to these economies, and vast opportunities to all exporters, from advanced and emerging 
economies alike.  By contrast, the advanced economies exhibit mostly low bound and applied 
tariffs (Table 1).  Hence they have few economically meaningful concessions to offer.  In 
sum, a “balanced” deal in NAMA alone is hard to achieve.  That puts additional pressures on 
getting substantial deals in the farm (and services) negotiations. 
 
NAMA negotiations benefit from a strong support from the world business community [Wall 
Street Journal, 27 April 2006, see www.iccwbo.org].  Moreover, European firms have clearly 
defined the minimal concessions they expect in NAMA from the emerging economies, i.e., 
                                                 
1/Draft 25 June 2006.  Director, Groupe d’Economie Mondiale at Sciences Po (GEM).  I would like to thank 
very much J. Curtis, F. Ismail, P. Low, J. Messerlin and S. Tangermann for very helpful comments and 
discussions.  Website: http://www.gem.sciences-po.fr.  
2/The basic Swiss formula is T = [rt/(r+t)] where ‘t’ are the initial tariffs, ‘T’ the post-negotiation tariffs, and ‘r’ 
the reduction factor – the only element to negotiate on.  In what follows, the expression “a Swiss60” means a 
Swiss formula with a reduction factor of 60. 
 2 
“no single [industrial] tariff above 15 percent at the end of the implementation period of the 
Doha Round (except for LDCs)” [UNICE 2006, www.unice.org]. 
 
A Swiss formula with a reduction factor of 20 (hereafter a “Swiss20”) would meet this 
request (Table 1).3/  A Swiss20 is not an easy target for the emerging economies if only 
because it imposes an average reduction of the bound tariffs of the emerging economies (54 
percent) higher than the reduction (50 percent) associated to the Swiss10 often envisaged for 
the advanced countries’ liberalisation.  This gap is seen by the emerging economies as a 
breach of the WTO principle of “less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments” for the 
developing coutries (even if the magnitude of applied tariff cuts is roughly the same (26 and 
28 percent) for the two groups of countries). 
 
There are two options for addressing the emerging economies’ concern.  First is that the 
advanced economies would liberalize more by agreeing to a Swiss factor smaller than 10 – an 
option that has the support of some advanced economies (Canada).  The second option is to 
accept the asymmetry in the NAMA concessions, and to get deeper concessions in the farm 
(and services) negotiations from the advanced economies. 
 
This is in this context that the Trade Ministers of France and a few other countries are 
insisting on a Swiss10 for the advanced economies, and on a Swiss15 for the emerging 
economies – hence overshooting the European business request since the average maximum 
tariff in the emerging countries would then be roughly 13 percent (Table 1).  And the same 
Ministers insist on only 92 percent of the tariffs in agriculture not above 100 percent and on a 
yet undefined cap for the remaining 8 percent.  This position is so hawkish, and so at odds 
with the views of the business, that it raises strong doubts as to whether or not the Ministers 
are genuinely willing to negotiate. 
 
Section 2.  The Farm Negotiations  
 
The second “gem” of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration is its Paragraph 24:  “[..] we 
instruct our negotiators to ensure that there is a comparably high level of ambition in market 
access for Agriculture and NAMA.”  This statement should be applied first to the farm tariff 
issue which has a major difference with its NAMA counterpart.  The business community 
                                                 
3/Calculations based on more detailed tariff schedules provide cuts in the applied tariffs of Brazil and India 
which are considered as not “significant enough” by some advanced economies. 
 3 
(farmers and food producers) of the major agricultural exporting countries have not publicly 
defined the minimal concessions they expect from the advanced economies.  Such a statement 
would give a sense of the magnitude of the gap, as assessed by businesses, between the tariff 
concessions requested by demandeurs and those offered by demandees.  And, it would also 
reveal any excessive request that governments may be tempted to do for tactical reasons. 
 
Assessing the tariff-cutting formula tabled by the EC 
 
The Doha formula for cutting farm tariffs is much murkier than in NAMA.  Negotiators 
should strike a deal on 16 figures – three thresholds defining four tariff ranges, four 
percentage cuts for each range, and a tariff cap for developed countries and the same for 
developing countries (Table 2).  This is a recipe for endless fights, bitterness and ultimatly 
failure. 
 
Assessing such a complex formula requires a benchmark.  Paragraph 24 suggests a Swiss-like 
approach as the natural benchmark.  Doing so provides a key result in the case of the EC tier-
based proposal.  It protects much more the initially most protected activities that a Swiss- like 
approach would do.  Any Swiss formula with a reduction factor lower than 175 (or 272!) 
would achieve two results (Figure 1 and Table 3).  On the one hand, it would impose deeper 
tariff cuts on the currently most protected products (for instance, on those with a tariff higher 
than 50 percent in the case of a Swiss60) than the EC tier-based formula.  But on the other 
hand, it would impose smaller tariff cuts on the currently less protected products (on those 
with a tariff smaller than 50 percent in the Swiss60 case) than the EC tier-based formula. 
 
As a result, European producers of the goods benefiting from smaller tariff cuts would clearly 
support a shift to a Swiss-like approach, while those associated to deeper tariff cuts would 
fight against it.  As long as the former constitute a larger and stronger coalition than the latter, 
a Swiss- like approach is politically superior to the current EC tier-based proposal. 
 
In order to have a sense of the forces in presence, Table 3 provides four informations for a 
few selected initial tariffs4/:  (i) the post-Doha tariffs generated by the current EC tier-based 
formula, (ii) the Swiss factors that would generate the same post-Doha tariffs, (iii) a sense of 
                                                 
4/The following calculations are based on European tariffs including estimated ad valorem equivalents of the 
specific tariffs.  Shares in terms of tariff lines take into account only the HS8 tariff lines having a tariff higher 
than 5 percent (roughly 70 percent of all the tariff lines).  This assumption is used in order not to inflate the 
results provided  (it reflects the fact that there is probably little, if any, European production for tariff lines with 
very low tariffs). 
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the relative size of the potential coalition of the loosers in Europe (by counting the number of 
tariff lines subjected to larger tariff cuts with a Swiss approach), and (iv) a sense of how hard 
these loosers would fight back (by calculating the additional tariff cuts generated by a shift to 
a Swiss- like approach, and by assuming that the larger the additional tariff cut is, the stronger 
the reaction of the vested interests is).  Table 3 suggests that a Swiss60 is a target within easy 
reach (80-85 percent of the tariffs would be less cut) while Table 4 presents the key elements 
of the tariff structure for the various Swiss factors selected. 
 
Farmers are not the main beneficiaries of the EC proposal 
 
Examining in more detail the current European proposal (on a product by product basis) 
provides three quite surprizing results.  First, the tariff cuts proposed by the EC tend much 
more often to protect food producers than farmers.  Only one-fourth of the 210 products that 
would remain the most protected after the Doha Round are farm products, and many of them 
raise questions.  For instance, why do products such as cucumbers and gherkins deserve such 
a favor?  As for rice, it is well known that rice-growers get subsidies large enough to enable 
them to shift to new crops if necessary (six rice-growing farms are among the top 10 
beneficiaries of farm subsidies in France)? 
 
Second, the food products that would remain the most protected after the Doha Round are a 
strange hodgepodge of waste products (dog and cat food, offal, whey, etc.) products with tiny 
potential in international trade (yoghurts) and goods pertaining to wide families of food 
products.  Liberalizing more these de facto industrial goods may require adjustment from the 
food producers, but it is unlikely to hurt noticeably European farmers (for instance, milk can 
be reallocated among a vast range of end-products, depending on their relative prices). 
 
Third, the post-Doha tariffs proposed by the EC vary hugely for minimal shifts in product 
classification within the same family of products.  For instance, the tariffs for different 
varieties of grape juice and those for different varieties of buttermilk vary by a factor of 2 or 3 
depending on the variety classification within their family.  This leaves the door wide open to 
misclassifications and corruption.  Moreover, because it would freeze for years these widely 
dispersed tariffs, a WTO agreement on such a basis would generate severe distortions in 
Europe’s agriculture. 
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These flaws reflect the 1994 Uruguay Round “dirty tariffication” which has allowed a 
massive use of specific tariffs (i.e., tariffs expressed in euros per physical unit) under the 
pressure of powerful lobbies.  They also mirror the world prices which have been used as a 
basis for calculating the ad valorem equivalents of these specific tariffs.  A tier-based formula 
softens the combined impact of these two factors (much) less than a Swiss-like formula 
because it compresses (much) less the higher tariffs than the lower ones. 
 
Back to the negotiating process 
 
Are then the agriculture negotiations doomed to fail?  No.  Europe can gain economically, 
diplomatically and politically by “rebalancing” its current offer – that is, by imposing deeper 
tariff cuts on the currently most protected products, and smaller tariff cuts on the currently 
less protected products. 
 
Economic gains for Europe would be twofold. Cutting deeper into the highest tariffs would 
amplify the welfare gains for European consumers – especially the poorest.  And, because it 
reduces the huge distortions created among the relative prices of the farm and food products 
by very different tariffs, a narrower range of post-Doha tariffs would generate a more far-
reaching and economically sound reallocation of resources amongst all these products. 
 
Diplomatically, Europe would give a welcome signal for serious negotiations.  This would be 
the case even with a Swiss60 which is very modest in the sense that it would deliver the same 
average agricultural tariff cut – from 24 percent to 13 percent (Table 4) – than the current 
European proposal.  But, compared to this current proposal, it would reduce from 45 to 37 
percent (i.e., an average additional tariff cut of 19 percent) the average post-Doha tariff of the 
210 most protected products (almost 15 percent of all the tariff lines with a tariff higher than 5 
percent) and it would introduce a tariff cap of roughly 50 percent (Table 4). 
 
Politically, cutting low tariffs (involving mostly farm products) by a lesser amount would 
receive the support of a vast majority of European farmers.  Compared to the current 
proposal, a Swiss60 would increase from 12.8 to 14.5 percent (i.e., an average 13 percent 
increase) the average post-Doha tariff of the less protected products (roughly 85 percent of the 
tariff lines).  Meanwhile it would still bring about a substantial opening of the European 
markets for these products since their current average tariff will be cut by 32 percent. 
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That said, with so few weeks left for negotiations, it may be unwise to reopen the debate on 
the type of formula in the WTO forum.  But mimicking a Swiss formula by a tier-based 
formula is not difficult.  For instance, a Swiss60 is approximated by a tier-based formula with 
the four (incremental) coefficients of 66.7, 33.3, 20.0 and 7.4 percent if one uses the four tiers 
defined in the current European proposal.5  And mimicking would allow to make full use of 
the possibly emerging agreements (for instance, on the tier definition). 
 
Balancing tariff cuts and domestic support cuts 
 
The tabled cuts in domestic support look huge in percentage terms, but this largely reflects 
“water in subsidies” (Table 5) although the U.S. case is uncertain since the new Farm Bill is 
not yet available.  That said, the deeper the farm tariff cuts are, the more convincingly Europe 
can argue that cuts in domestic subsidies should merely consolidate the foreseen evolution of 
its subsidy regime in order to facilitate European adjustment to possible trade turbulences. 
 
But, such modest cuts should be paid by much stricter definitions of the current Boxes in 
order to ensure that domestic subsidies will be used only for softening the impact of possible 
trade turbulences (protecting endangered farmers’ incomes in the importing countries) not for 
increasing production.  The real impact of cuts in domestic support can be easily eroded by 
box-playing or shifting, as illustrated by the 2003 CAP reform which introduced “decoupled” 
subsidies without liberalizing the European farm sector (other things being constant, it 
reduced the European overall level of protection from 57 to 55 percent [OECD. 2004. 
Analysis of CAP Reform. www.oecd.org].  That said, defining subsidies is a serious problem 
for the U.S., not for Europe. 
 
“Flexibilities”:  Negotiators as “Penelopes” 
 
The lack of political will in major WTO members tends to turn the Doha negotiators into 
“Penelopes” fighting for substantial tariff cuts, and then agreeing on lavish provisions 
undercutting these cuts.  Doing so will only infuriate both free traders (frustated by illusory 
                                                 
5/Except the first one, these coefficients are not directly comparable to the tabled reductions because they are 
incremental. Assuming the EC definition of the tiers, T = t*0.667 for the first tier.  For the second tier, T = 20 + 
(t-30)*0.334.  For the third tier, T = 30 + (t-60)*0.200.  For the last tier, T = 36 + (t-90)*0.074.  Note that the 
coefficient 0.667 (the only one directly comparable to the tabled reductions) is almost within the range of 
reductions [20-65] mentioned in the paper on the modalities presented by the Chairman of the Committee on 
Agriculture, Special session, 22 June 2006.  
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market access) and anti-globalizers (attributing all the future problems faced by a country to a 
fictitious liberalisation).  Agricultural negotiations provide two illustrations of this danger. 
 
The Doha negotiators are playing with “tariff-rate quotas” (i.e., limited imported quantities of 
a good are subjected to a “in quota” tariff which is lower than the normal “out-of-quota” tariff 
imposed on the rest of the imports of this product).  The Urugay Round used them as a device 
for beginning to open farm markets left closed by the very high tariffs agreed in this Round.  
In the Doha negotiations, the EC (and other WTO Members) is using them as a device for 
reducing less the out-of-quota tariffs – increasing quantities to be imported under the in-quota 
tariff is the “price” to be paid for keeping the out-of-quota tariff high.  This is a self-defeating 
tactic.  If the European demand becomes smaller than the quota, the EC price will reflect the 
low in-quota tariff (the out-of-quota tariff playing no role).  If the European demand still 
exceeds the quota, the EC price will be determined by the world price plus the high out-of-
quota tariff, generating huge rents for the quota beneficiaries.  Who are these beneficiaries?  
The answer depends on several parameters.  But there is an almost sure bet:  not the European 
farmers.  And there is a very good chance that the ultimate beneficiaries would be the foreign 
traders and/or food producers.  What does such a flexibility mean? 
 
The Doha negotiators are also playing with the notion of “sensitive” products benefiting from 
tariff cuts smaller than the ones generated by the agreed formula.  Initially, the EC proposed 
that up to 8 percent of all the tariff lines (representing 12 percent of the tariff lines with a 
tariff higher than 5 percent) could be treated as sensitive products.  Such a proposal has three 
consequences.  First, it will generate a nightmare in terms of domestic lobbying:  European 
producers will fight hard between themselves for being the beneficiaries of such a regime.  
Second, it does not seem fortuitious that all the agricultural products with a tariff below 50-60 
percent and already under a tariff- rate quota represent roughly 8 percent of all the tariff lines.  
Third, the 450 products or so which would be declared sensitive or protected by the highest 
tariffs represent the bulk of EC agricultural production.  In sum, the Doha Round would have 
mostly produced a fake liberalisation.  Liberalisation would be limited to products for which 
there is no powerful lobby in Europe.  Europe may have comparative advantages in such 
products, but it may not benefit from them since the protected sector is large and protected 
enough to absorb all the available resources.  Again, what does such a flexibility mean? 
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Concluding remarks 
 
As a result, for the few weeks left, the best rule may be, paradoxically, to think long term.  If 
Europe needs to rebalance more deeply its proposal in order to boost domestic support, so be 
it (a variant of the Swiss formula would protect the initially low protected farmers better than 
the “classic” Swiss formula, while allowing to be slightly more ambitious at the margin. 6/)  If 
sacrificing a couple of points or so in a Swiss reduction factor may be the price to pay for 
minimizing or eliminating “flexibilities”, so be it.  The next Round will take over much more 
easily a modest but clean Doha outcome that if it inherits from an apparently bigger outcome, 
but tied to distortions entrenched in a few highly protected sectors and to perverse flexibility 
provisions.  The lesson of fifty years of trade policy in textiles and clothing should be learnt. 
 
Some European politicians have declared that they hope to save the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) by letting the Doha Round fail.  This is a total illusion.  The Doha negotiations 
(even if unsuccessful) are giving the finishing stroke to the current CAP.  First, they are 
revealing to farmers the true European priorities shown above.  Second, they are making 
European farmers increasingly aware of the fact that the impact of common European tariffs 
varies with each Member state production structure.  An European country producing mostly 
farm goods protected by high European tariffs is more protected than a country producing 
mostly farm goods protected by moderate European tariffs.  This is why today, agriculture is, 
on average, roughly twice as protected in Ireland as in southern Europe (Table 6).  It is in the 
own interest of the European farmers to have similar tariffs on all the farm products.  Only 
such tariffs ensure the level playing field that European farmers will need when the new CAP 
provides for less subsidies, distributed very differently amongst European farmers. 
 
Ironically, France would be a major beneficiary of successful Doha negotiations in 
agriculture.  As French farmers are not among the most protected in Europe (contrary to a 
wide belief) they will benefit from rebalanced tariffs.  And as they are among the most 
efficient in Europe, they will benefit from a serious CAP reform – as well as the European 
consumers, especially the poorest.  French farmers are beginning to realize all this, and to 
wonder whether they should not support a swift CAP reform.  When will French politicians 
do the same, and lead instead of dragging behind? 
 
                                                 
6/For instance, T = rt/(ra  + ta)1/a  where ‘r’ is the usual reduction factor and ‘a’ a “political” factor (to be 
negotiated) aiming to reduce tariff cuts in the low tariff range, hence to boost political support. 
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Table 1A.  Estimates of tariff cuts in NAMA:  Selected emerging economies
Average Average Tariffs Tariffs
bound applied avg max >15% avg max >15%
tariff tariff tariffs tariffs [a] tariffs tariffs [a]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
China2001 [b] -- 14.4 7.7 16.4 0.3 6.7 12.9 0.0
South Africa 11.0 8.3 5.2 15.0 1.6 4.5 12.0 0.0
Malaysia 11.2 8.6 5.4 18.8 0.2 4.7 14.3 0.0
Philippines 16.7 9.2 8.1 14.3 0.0 7.0 11.5 0.0
Thailand 20.2 13.4 9.2 16.0 0.7 7.8 12.6 0.0
Brazil 29.4 15.1 11.6 16.2 0.0 9.7 12.8 0.0
Mexico 34.8 17.2 12.7 14.3 0.0 10.4 11.5 0.0
Indonesia 35.0 8.3 12.2 17.2 0.5 10.1 13.4 0.0
India2001 37.0 33.9 12.4 17.6 0.3 10.2 13.6 0.0
Average [c] 24.4 14.3 9.4 16.2 0.4 7.9 12.7 0.0
China2005 9.2 9.1 5.8 14.3 0.0 5.2 11.5 0.0
India2005 37.0 12.5
Table 1B.  Estimates of tariff cuts in NAMA:  Selected advanced economies
Average Average Tariffs Tariffs
bound applied avg max >15% avg max >15%
tariff tariff tariffs tariffs [a] tariffs tariffs [a]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Japan 2.3 1.6 1.4 7.4 0.0 1.0 4.3 0.0
USA 3.4 2.6 1.9 7.9 0.0 1.4 4.4 0.0
EC 4.0 3.9 2.4 8.5 0.0 1.8 4.6 0.0
Singapore 4.1 0.0 2.2 5.0 0.0 1.5 3.3 0.0
Taiwan 4.7 4.5 2.6 8.6 0.0 1.9 4.6 0.0
Canada 5.3 3.3 2.7 7.1 0.0 1.9 4.2 0.0
Korea 10.2 6.7 4.3 7.9 0.0 2.8 4.4 0.0
Australia 11.0 3.5 4.1 8.5 0.0 2.7 4.6 0.0
New-Zealand 11.1 3.1 3.6 8.2 0.0 2.2 4.5 0.0
Average 6.2 3.3 2.8 7.7 0.0 1.9 4.3 0.0
Sources: Integrated Tariff Analysis System, Australian Productivity Commission, 2004. China's tariff schedule
for 2001. Press reports for India 2005. Author's computations.
Note [a]: Number (in percent) of HS6 lines with tariffs still higher than 15 percent after trade liberalisation.
Note [b]: Calculations based on Chinese tariffs applied in 2001.
Note [c]: Simple averages.
with a Swiss10 with a Swiss5
Bound tariffs
Post-Doha tariffs Post-Doha tariffs
Bound tariffs
Bound tariffs
Post-Doha tariffs
Bound tariffs
same as for India 2001
Initial tariffs
Initial tariffs
with a Swiss20 with a Swiss15
same as for India 2001
Post-Doha tariffs
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Table 2. Tabled proposals in the farm negotiations, selected tabled tier-based formulas
definition tariff cut definition tariff cut definition tariff cut
of the tiers (%) (%) (%)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Tariff cuts to be imposed on developed countries
highest tier >90% 60 >75% 75 >60% 85-90
medium high tier 60-90% 50 50-75% 65 40-60% 75-85
medium low tier 30-60% 45 20-50% 55 20-40% 65-75
lowest tier 0-30% 35 0-20% 45 0-20% 55-65
Tariff cuts to be imposed on developing countries
highest tier >130% 40 >130% 40 >60% [a]
medium high tier 80-130% 35 80-130% 35 40-60% [a]
medium low tier 30-80% 30 30-80% 30 20-40% [a]
lowest tier 0-30% 25 <30% 25 0-20% [a]
Other elements of tariff rates
cap tariff (developed countries) -- 100 -- 100 -- 75
cap tariff (developing countries) -- 150 -- 150 -- 100
Source: The EC, G20 and U.S. proposals.  Note [a]: Reference to "slightly lesser reductions".
EC proposal G20 proposal U.S. proposal
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Figure 1. Assessing the EC tier-based formula
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Table 3.  Assessing the European tariff-cutting formula
Post-Doha Swiss
tariff reduction
Initial generated factor
tariff by the leading to
(%) EC tier the same
formula post-Doha Number of Nber (in%) tariff cuts tariff cuts average maximum
(%) tariff tariff lines all tar. lines 5%-10% > 10% cut  (%) cut  (%)
1 [a] 2 3 4 5 [b] 6 7 8 [c] 9 [c]
408.0 163.0 272 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0
260.0 105.0 175 1 0.1 0 1 (40.2) (40.2)
120.0 48.0 80 [d] 55 3.8 11 27 13.0 44.3
80.0 40.0 80 [d] 129 8.9 11 27 4.5 44.3
70.0 35.0 70 161 11.0 14 37 6.9 50.4
60.0 30.0 60 [d] 210 14.4 61 48 8.7 56.8
60.0 30.0 60 [d] 288 19.8 61 48 6.7 56.8
40.0 22.0 50 367 25.2 92 91 8.3 63.7
20.0 13.0 37 718 49.3 137 174 7.5 73.3
Author's computations.
Note [a]: These tariffs include the estimated ad valorem equivalents of the specific tariffs.
Note [b]: The percentages are based only on the number of tariff lines with tariffs higher than 5 percent (see text).
Note [c]: The additional tariff cut related to the most protected product (408 percent) is not taken into account for the
six bottom initial tariffs. Column 8 gives the average additional cuts in percentage points.
Note [d]: Discontinuities in the tier-based formula open the possibility of several Swiss factors or several results.
by the Swissformula generates
formulaadditional
Magnitude of theNumber of tariff
cuts generatedshifting to a Swiss
additional tarifflines for which
based formula
Swiss formula
protected by a
Tariff lines "less"
than by the tier-
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Table 4. Selected alternative tariff structures
Current EC tier-
tariffs based
formula S37 S50 S60 S70 S80
Tariff distribution (%)
Zero tariff 17.9 18,0 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9
Range 0-10 [a] 24.3 37.5 33.9 30.3 28.8 28.6 27.7
Range 10-20 21,9 24,3 31,3 29,8 29,2 27,5 27,1
Range 20-30 11,7 7,8 15,5 14,6 13,7 12,9 12,5
Range 30-40 5,3 7,0 1,3 6,9 7,9 8,4 8,3
Range 40-50 4,9 3,0 0,0 0,5 2,7 3,7 4,5
Range 50-60 3,4 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0 1,8
Range >60 10,5 1,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1
Comparison with the NAMA target of no tariff higher than 15 percent
Range 0-15 54,4 67,7 69,8 66,3 64,1 62,7 62,3
Summary indicators (in %)
Average tariff 24,4 12,9 10,7 12,2 13,1 13,9 14,6
Maximum tariff 407,8 163,1 33,9 44,5 52,3 59,7 66,9
2nd highest tariff [b] 264,3 105,7 32,5 42,0 48,9 56,3 61,4
Author's computations. Notes [a]: zero tariff excluded.  [b]: second highest tariff.
Swiss-type formula
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Farm domestic support in the EC and the U.S.
units U.S. EC25
1.  The Amber Box (the most trade-distorting subsidies)
Uruguay Round commitments billion US$ 19 89
Effective amounts in 2004 billion US$ 13 42
Estimated amounts in 2006-2010 billion US$ [a] 26
The Doha proposals on subsidy cuts
EC proposal percent 60 70
U.S. proposal percent 60 83
G20 proposal percent 70 80
EC proposal billion US$ 8 27
U.S. proposal billion US$ 8 15
G20 proposal billion US$ 6 18
2.  Overall Trade Distorting Support (sum of AMS, de minimis and Blue Box)
Uruguay Round commitments billion US$ 55 149
Effective amounts in 2004 billion US$ 23 74
Estimated amounts in 2006-2010 billion US$ [a] 40
The Doha proposals on subsidy cuts
EC proposal percent 60 70
U.S. proposal percent 53 75
G20 proposal percent 75 80
EC proposal billion US$ 22 45
U.S. proposal billion US$ 26 37
G20 proposal billion US$ 14 30
Source: EC, U.S. and G20 Proposals, Penn 2005, Jales and Nassar 2006, Kutas 2006.  
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T a b l e  6 .   F a r m  P r o t e c t i o n  o f  E u r o p e a n  M e m b e r  S t a t e s
M e m b e r  s t a t e s P S E s T a r i f f s
[ a ] [ b ]
A u s t r i a 5 9 2 5 , 3
B e l g i u m 5 7 2 6 , 0
B r i t a i n 7 2 2 8 , 5
C y p r u s - - - -
C z e c h  R e p . 5 7 2 8 , 4
D e n m a r k 5 4 2 8 , 9
E s t o n i a 5 5 2 9 , 1
F i n l a n d 7 2 2 8 , 2
F r a n c e 5 9 2 3 , 6
G e r m a n y 6 1 2 6 , 4
G r e e c e 4 0 1 9 , 8
H u n g a r y 4 4 2 5 , 3
I r e l a n d 9 9 2 9 , 8
I ta ly 4 5 2 0 , 6
L a t v i a 5 9 2 6 , 8
L i t h u a n i a 6 2 2 8 , 4
L u x e m b o u r g 7 5 2 7 , 9
M a l t a 3 7 2 0 , 7
N e t h e r l a n d 5 3 2 0 , 8
P o l a n d 4 7 2 6 , 7
P o r t u g a l 4 3 2 0 , 1
S l o v a k i a 5 4 2 7 , 2
S l o v e n i a 5 7 2 3 , 6
S p a i n 4 3 2 1 , 0
S w e d e n 7 1 2 7 , 3
E C - 1 5 5 5 2 3 , 9
E C - 2 5  [ c ] 5 7 2 5 , 4
S o u r c e s :  O C D E ,  W T O .  A u t h o r ' s  c o m p u t a t i o n s .
[ a ]  P S E : P r o d u c e r  s u p p o r t  e q u i v a l e n t s  ( i n  p e r c e n t ) .
[ b ]  A d  v a l o r e m  t a r i f f s  ( s p e c i f i c  t a r i f f  e q u i v a l e n t s  i n c l u d e d ) .
[ c ]  s i m p l e  a v e r a g e .  
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